An examination of Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) data reveals a general decline in the tax-to-GSDP ratios across a majority of India's primary states over the last decade.

根據印度審計總長 (CAG) 的數據顯示，在過去十年中，印度大多數主要邦的稅收佔 GSDP 比率普遍下降。

The fiscal landscape of Indian states is characterized by a structural asymmetry wherein expenditure responsibilities exceed revenue-raising powers. Data from 2015-16 to 2024-25 indicates that 12 of 18 major states experienced a contraction in their State Own Tax Revenue (SOTR) relative to their Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP). While the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) has restricted fiscal autonomy, the data suggests that GST is not the sole determinant of revenue decline, as state GST constitutes only 43.4% of SOTR as of 2024-25.

印度各邦的財政狀況具有結構性不對稱的特點，即支出責任超過了籌款權力。2015-16 年至 2024-25 年的數據顯示，18 個主要邦中有 12 個的邦自有稅收 (SOTR) 相對於其邦內生產總值 (GSDP) 縮減。雖然實施貨物及服務稅 (GST) 限制了財政自主權，但數據顯示 GST 並非稅收下降的唯一決定因素，因為截至 2024-25 年，邦 GST 僅佔 SOTR 的 43.4%。

Disaggregation of tax heads reveals significant variance in mobilization efficiency. The coefficient of variation indicates that taxes on goods and sales are the most uniform (0.12), whereas stamp duties exhibit higher volatility (0.46). Specific policy decisions have further impacted these metrics; for instance, Bihar's imposition of prohibition in 2016 resulted in a substantial loss of excise revenue, contributing to its position as the worst overall performer. Conversely, Chhattisgarh is identified as the sole state to achieve growth in both goods-related and non-goods-related tax ratios.

將各項稅目拆解後發現，動員效率存在顯著差異。變異係數顯示，貨物稅和銷售稅最為統一 (0.12)，而印花稅則表現出較高的波動性 (0.46)。特定政策決定進一步影響了這些指標；例如，比哈爾邦在 2016 年實施禁酒令，導致消費稅收入大幅損失，使其成為整體表現最差的邦。相反，恰蒂斯加爾邦被認定為唯一在貨物相關與非貨物相關稅率均實現增長的邦。

Stakeholder positioning reflects a tension between fiscal prudence and political imperatives. The proliferation of populist expenditure schemes has strained the fiscal health of even high-performing states like Maharashtra. Furthermore, a dichotomy exists between wealthier states, which contend that current devolution formulas penalize economic efficiency, and states like Bihar, which seek central concessions despite self-induced revenue losses.

利益相關者的定位反映了財政審慎與政治需求之間的緊張關係。民粹主義支出計劃的激增，使得即使是像馬哈拉施特拉邦這樣表現優異的邦，財政健康也受到壓力。此外，富裕邦與比哈爾邦等邦之間存在對立：前者主張目前的撥款公式懲罰了經濟效率，而後者儘管承受自招的稅收損失，仍尋求中央政府的讓步。

The current fiscal environment is marked by a widespread deterioration in state revenue mobilization, necessitating a dual approach of expenditure restraint and policy reform.

目前的財政環境以邦稅收動員普遍惡化為特徵，因此需要採取支出限制與政策改革的雙管齊下方法。