European countries want more weapons. But experts say the way they buy and make weapons is not good.

歐洲國家想要更多武器，但專家表示他們購買和製造武器的方式並不理想。

European countries spend more money on the military now. Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Germany spent 114 billion dollars last year. They want to be safe.

歐洲國家現在在軍事方面投入更多資金。俄羅斯在 2022 年入侵烏克蘭。德國去年花費了 1,140 億美元。他們希望確保安全。

Companies have many orders for weapons. But they do not make the weapons fast enough. European countries do not work together. France and Germany stopped a big plane project because they disagreed.

公司接到了許多武器訂單，但製造速度不夠快。歐洲國家之間缺乏合作。法國與德國因為意見分歧而停止了一個大型飛機項目。

Only a few big companies get the money. Small companies cannot help. Some experts say countries are too afraid to try new things. They want to protect their own business.

只有少數幾家大公司能獲得資金，小公司無法提供幫助。一些專家表示，各國太害怕嘗試新事物，因為他們想要保護自己的產業。

Some people worry about the money. The economy is not strong. Some leaders want to spend money on hospitals and schools instead of weapons.

有些人擔心資金問題。經濟並不強勁。一些領導人希望將資金投入在醫院和學校，而非武器。

Europe is spending more money. But the countries still disagree and the system is slow.

歐洲雖然投入更多資金，但各國之間依然存在分歧，且系統運行緩慢。

European countries are currently trying to improve their military capabilities, but experts suggest that current production and purchasing systems are not sufficient to reach these goals.

歐洲國家目前正嘗試提升其軍事能力，但專家建議目前的生產與採購系統不足以達成這些目標。

The recent increase in defense spending is a reaction to the period of military downsizing after the Cold War and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. This change was further caused by doubts about the reliability of security guarantees from the United States. Consequently, governments have taken financial steps to increase spending; for example, Germany changed its laws to allow for more military investment. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 29 European NATO members spent $559 billion on defense last year, with Germany's spending rising by 24% to $114 billion.

近期國防開支的增加，是對冷戰後軍隊縮減以及 2022 年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭的反應。這一轉變 further 是由於對美國安全保證的可靠性產生懷疑。因此，各國政府採取了財務措施以增加開支；例如，德國修改法律以允許更多軍事投資。根據斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所的數據，29 個歐洲北約成員國去年國防開支達 5,590 億美元，其中德國的開支增長了 24%，達到 1,140 億美元。

However, there is still a gap between strategic goals and actual industrial output. Although companies like Leonardo, Thales, and Rheinmetall have more orders, financial data suggests they are struggling to turn these orders into actual profits. This inefficiency is made worse by the fact that European companies are smaller than American competitors and often focus only on their own national interests. For instance, the failure of the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) due to corporate disagreements shows how difficult it is for countries to cooperate when their priorities differ.

然而，戰略目標與實際工業產出之間仍存在差距。雖然 Leonardo、Thales 和 Rheinmetall 等公司接到了更多訂單，但財務數據顯示，他們在將這些訂單轉化為實際利潤方面陷入掙扎。由於歐洲公司規模小於美國競爭對手，且往往僅關注自身的國家利益，使得這種低效率情況更加嚴重。例如，法德未來戰鬥航空系統 (FCAS) 因企業分歧而失敗，顯示出當各國優先事項不同時，合作是多麼困難。

Furthermore, institutional problems in purchasing are slowing down progress. The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs emphasized that the main obstacle is institutional rather than financial, citing a fear of risk and protectionist attitudes. Additionally, research from Bruegel shows that most spending is concentrated among the top ten contractors, which may stop smaller companies from innovating. To solve these issues, some experts propose 'minilateral systems,' where small groups of aligned states work together to create standard equipment and increase production scale.

此外，採購方面的體制問題也拖慢了進度。挪威國際事務研究所強調，主要障礙在於體制而非財務，並指出這是由於對風險的恐懼和保護主義態度。此外，Bruegel 的研究顯示，大部分開支集中在前十大承包商手中，這可能會阻礙小型公司的創新。為了解決這些問題，一些專家建議採用「小多邊系統」，即由一小組志同道合的國家共同合作，創造標準化設備並擴大生產規模。

Europe is currently in a transition period, attempting to balance higher military spending with systemic inefficiencies and conflicting national interests.

歐洲目前處於過渡期，試圖在提高軍事開支、體制低效率與衝突的國家利益之間取得平衡。

European nations are currently attempting to augment their military capabilities, although experts suggest the existing production and procurement frameworks are inadequate for these objectives.

歐洲國家目前正嘗試提升其軍事能力，儘管專家認為現有的生產與採購框架不足以達成這些目標。

The contemporary shift toward increased defense expenditure is a reaction to the post-Cold War era of military downsizing and the subsequent 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. This transition has been further catalyzed by perceived instabilities in United States security guarantees. Consequently, fiscal measures have been implemented, such as Germany's constitutional amendments to facilitate military spending. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicates that 29 European NATO members expended $559 billion on defense last year, with Germany's contribution increasing by 24% to $114 billion.

當前轉向增加國防開支，是對冷戰後軍隊縮編以及隨後 2022 年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭的反應。由於感知到美國安全保障的不穩定性，進一步催化了這一轉變。因此，各國採取了財政措施，例如德國修改憲法以便利軍事開支。斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所的數據顯示，29 個歐洲北約成員國去年在國防方面支出 5,590 億美元，其中德國的貢獻增加 24% 至 1,140 億美元。

Despite increased capital allocation, a divergence persists between strategic intent and industrial output. While firms such as Leonardo, Thales, and Rheinmetall report expanded order books, first-quarter 2026 financial data suggests a failure to convert these orders into commensurate earnings. This inefficiency is exacerbated by a lack of scale relative to American competitors and a propensity for national fragmentation. The termination of the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) due to corporate disagreements illustrates the fragility of multilateral cooperation when national priorities diverge.

儘管資本配置增加，但策略意圖與工業產出之間仍存在分歧。雖然 Leonardo、Thales 和 Rheinmetall 等公司報告訂單量擴大，但 2026 年第一季的財務數據顯示，未能將這些訂單轉化為相應的收益。由於相對於美國競爭對手缺乏規模且傾向於國家碎片化，這種低效率被進一步加劇。法德未來航空戰鬥系統 (FCAS) 因企業分歧而終止，說明了當國家優先事項分歧時，多邊合作的脆弱性。

Institutional bottlenecks in procurement further impede progress. The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs characterizes the primary obstacle as institutional rather than financial, citing risk-aversion and protectionist tendencies. Furthermore, research from Bruegel indicates a concentration of procurement within the top ten contractors—representing 67% to 90% of spending in the UK, Poland, and Germany—which potentially stifles innovation from smaller enterprises. To mitigate these issues, the adoption of 'minilateral systems' involving small cohorts of aligned states is proposed to achieve standardization and scale.

採購中的制度瓶頸進一步阻礙了進展。挪威國際事務研究所將主要障礙定性為制度性而非財務性，並引用風險厭惡和保護主義傾向。此外，Bruegel 的研究指出，採購高度集中於前十大承包商——在英國、波蘭和德國佔支出比例達 67% 至 90%——這可能會扼殺小型企業的創新。為了緩解這些問題，建議採用涉及少數志同道合國家的「小多邊體系」以實現標準化與規模化。

Finally, the sustainability of this spending trajectory is questioned amid broader economic volatility. The Stoxx Europe Targeted Defense index has declined by over 15% since January. While some states view defense expenditure as a mechanism for industrial stimulation and job creation, others perceive it as a competitor to social welfare funding. Nevertheless, the necessity of securing critical infrastructure against hybrid threats remains a universal requirement across the continent.

最後，在更廣泛的經濟波動中，這種支出軌跡的可持續性受到質疑。Stoxx 歐洲國防目標指數自 1 月以來下跌超過 15%。雖然部分國家將國防開支視為工業刺激與創造就業的機制，但其他國家則將其視為社會福利資金的競爭對手。儘管如此，保障關鍵基礎設施以應對混合威脅，仍是整個歐洲的普遍要求。

Europe remains in a state of transition, attempting to reconcile increased military spending with systemic institutional inefficiencies and fragmented national interests.

歐洲仍處於轉型狀態，試圖將增加的軍事開支與系統性制度低效及碎片化的國家利益調和。