The US Supreme Court says that phone location data is private. This changes how police find people using phones.

美國最高法院表示，手機定位數據屬於隱私。這改變了警方利用手機尋找人員的方式。

In 2019, a robbery happened in Virginia. Police asked Google for a list of all phones in one area. They wanted to find the criminal.

2019年，維吉尼亞州發生了一起搶劫案。警方要求Google提供該區域內所有手機的清單，希望能找到罪犯。

Some people say phones are not private. But the Court said phones are private. Six judges agreed and three judges did not.

有些人認為手機並不具有隱私性，但法院表示手機具有隱私性。六位法官表示贊同，三位法官則不同意。

More police use this tool now. Between 2017 and 2018, the number of requests grew a lot. They use Wi-Fi and towers to find people.

現在有更多警察使用這項工具。在2017年至2018年間，請求數量大幅增長。他們利用Wi-Fi和基地台來尋找人員。

The Court sent the case back to a lower court. That court must decide if the police followed the law in this one case.

法院將此案發回下級法院。該法院必須決定警方在此案件中是否遵守法律。

The United States Supreme Court has decided that cellphone location data is protected by the Fourth Amendment. This ruling significantly affects how law enforcement can use geofence warrants during criminal investigations.

美國最高法院已裁定，手機位置數據受到第四修正案的保護。這項裁決顯著影響了執法部門在刑事調查中如何使用地理圍欄搜查令。

The decision came from the case of Chatrie v. United States, which started after an armed robbery in Virginia in 2019. In that case, police used a geofence warrant to force Google to identify every mobile device within a specific 17.5-acre area during a two-hour window. This process is different from traditional police work because, instead of targeting a specific suspect based on evidence, it collects data from everyone in a certain area to find a suspect. Consequently, this method has raised concerns about whether it violates the constitutional requirement for warrants to be specific.

這項決定源於 Chatrie v. United States 案，該案始於 2019 年在維吉尼亞州發生的一起持械搶劫案。在那起案件中，警方使用地理圍欄搜查令，強制 Google 在兩小時的時間窗口內，識別出特定 17.5 英畝區域內的所有行動裝置。這個過程與傳統的警察偵查不同，因為它不是根據證據針對特定嫌疑人，而是收集特定區域內所有人的數據以尋找嫌疑人。因此，這種方法引起了人們對其是否違反搜查令必須具體之憲法要求的擔憂。

The government argued that people give up their right to privacy when they choose to use location services on their phones. However, in a 6-3 decision, the Court rejected this argument. The judges emphasized that using a smartphone does not mean a person agrees to give up their constitutional protections. This ruling follows a previous case from 2018, Carpenter v. United States, which also recognized that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their location data. On the other hand, the minority of judges argued that information shared with a third party, like Google, should not be private.

政府主張，當人們選擇在手機上使用位置服務時，即表示放棄了私隱權。然而，法院以 6 比 3 的裁決駁回了這一論點。法官強調，使用智慧型手機並不意味著一個人同意放棄其憲法保障。這項裁決延續了 2018 年的 Carpenter v. United States 案例，該案同樣承認人們對其位置數據具有合理的私隱期待。另一方面，少數派法官則認為，與 Google 等第三方分享的資訊不應被視為私隱。

Furthermore, the use of this surveillance technology has grown rapidly. Google reported that requests for geofence data increased by 1,500% between 2017 and 2018. Between 2021 and 2023, these warrants made up more than 25% of all law enforcement requests to the company. This technology works by combining data from cell towers, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth signals, often using artificial intelligence to analyze user behavior.

此外，這種監控技術的應用迅速增長。Google 報告指出，地理圍欄數據的請求在 2017 年至 2018 年間增長了 1,500%。在 2021 年至 2023 年間，這類搜查令佔了執法部門向該公司提出所有請求的 25% 以上。這項技術透過結合基地台、Wi-Fi 和藍牙訊號的數據，通常利用人工智慧來分析用戶行為。

The Supreme Court has now sent the case back to the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to decide if the specific warrant used in the Chatrie case followed the law.

最高法院現已將此案發回美國第四巡迴上訴法院，以判定 Chatrie 案中使用的特定搜查令是否合法。

The United States Supreme Court has determined that cellphone location data is protected under the Fourth Amendment, impacting the legality of geofence warrants used in criminal investigations.

美國最高法院判定手機位置數據受第四修正案保護，影響了刑事調查中使用地理圍欄搜查令的合法性。

The judicial determination emerged from Chatrie v. United States, a case originating from a 2019 armed robbery in Midlothian, Virginia. Law enforcement utilized a geofence warrant to compel Google to identify all mobile devices within a 17.5-acre perimeter during a specific two-hour window. This process involved a tripartite collaboration: the definition of a spatial-temporal boundary, the provision of anonymized device lists by the service provider, and the subsequent 'unmasking' of specific identities. This methodology represents a reversal of traditional investigative protocols, as it aggregates data from all individuals in a vicinity to identify a suspect, rather than targeting a specific individual based on prior probable cause.

此司法判定源於「Chatrie 訴美國案」，該案始於 2019 年發生在維吉尼亞州 Midlothian 的一起持械搶劫案。執法部門利用地理圍欄搜查令，強制 Google 識別在特定兩小時窗口內、 17.5 英畝周邊範圍內的所有行動裝置。此過程涉及三方協作：定義時空邊界、由服務供應商提供匿名裝置清單，以及隨後對特定身份的「去匿名化」。這種方法代表了傳統調查協定的反轉，因為它是透過彙整附近所有個人的數據來識別嫌疑人，而非根據先前的合理理由針對特定個人。

Institutional friction exists regarding the 'particularity' requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The government contended that users forfeit privacy expectations by opting into location services. However, the Court, in a 6-3 decision, rejected this premise, asserting that ordinary utilization of smartphone technology does not constitute a waiver of constitutional protections. This ruling aligns with the precedent established in Carpenter v. United States (2018), which recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site location information. Conversely, the dissent argued that information voluntarily surrendered to a third party lacks such privacy expectations.

關於第四修正案的「特定性」要求，制度上存在分歧。政府主張用戶透過選擇開啟位置服務，即放棄了對私隱的期望。然而，法院以 6 比 3 的裁決否決了這一前提，認定對智慧型手機技術的正常使用並不構成對憲法保障的放棄。此裁決與 2018 年「Carpenter 訴美國案」確立的先例一致，即認可對手機基地台位置資訊具有合理的私隱期望。相反，反對意見則認為，自願提交給第三方的資訊缺乏此類私隱期望。

Statistically, the adoption of this surveillance mechanism has seen exponential growth. Google reported a 1,500% increase in geofence requests between 2017 and 2018, with such warrants comprising over 25% of all law enforcement requests to the company between 2021 and 2023. The technical infrastructure enabling this capability relies on a synthesis of cell tower data, Wi-Fi connectivity, and Bluetooth signals, often processed via artificial intelligence to derive behavioral insights.

從統計數據來看，這種監控機制的採用呈指數級成長。Google 報告指出，2017 年至 2018 年間，地理圍欄請求增加了 1,500%；在 2021 年至 2023 年間，此類搜查令佔執法部門向該公司所有請求的 25% 以上。實現此功能的技術基礎依賴於手機基地台數據、Wi-Fi 連接和藍牙訊號的綜合運用，且通常透過人工智慧處理以獲取行為洞察。

The Supreme Court has remanded the case to the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to determine if the specific geofence warrant in the Chatrie case adhered to constitutional requirements.

最高法院已將案件發回第四巡迴上訴法院，以判定 Chatrie 案中的特定地理圍欄搜查令是否符合憲法要求。